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JUDGING IN THE DAYS OF THE EARLY REPUBLIC:
A CRITIQUE OF JUDGE RICHARD ARNOLD'S USE OF
HISTORY IN ANASTASOFF v. UNITED STATES
R. Ben Brown*
In a recent Eighth Circuit panel decision, Judge Richard S.
Arnold wrote for the court on the precedential value of an
unreported decision found to control the case under
consideration.' In doing so, he found Eighth Circuit Rule 28A(i),
which allowed panels to avoid the precedential effect of
unpublished opinions, to be unconstitutional.2 He reasoned that
the doctrine of precedent was well established at the time of the
framing of the Constitution and created a limit on judicial
power, which was written into Article III.' Judge Arnold recited
the theory of precedent as laid out by a series of seventeenth and
eighteenth century judicial scholarly works, especially
* Assistant Professor of Law and Associate Director, Lawyering Skills Program,
John Marshall Law School; B.A., Centenary College; J.D. Vanderbilt University; A.M.,
Ph.D., University of Michigan. I would like to thank Hazel Espinar, my research assistant,
for her help in gathering sources and Professor Coleen Barger for her help with citing these
old cases using modern technology.
I. Anastasoff v. U.S., 223 F.3d 898 (8th Cir. 2000), vacated as moot, 235 F.3d 1054
(8th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (citing Christie v. U.S., No. 91-2375MN (8th Cir. Mar. 20, 1992)
(per curiam)). The actual issue in Anastasoff was whether the appellant was due a refund
on overpaid federal income taxes when she mailed the claim within three years of the
overpayment, but the claim was received by the Internal Revenue Service three years and a
day after overpayment. In Christie, the court had rejected a similar taxpayer's claim. Id. at
899. The taxpayer argued that since the earlier opinion was unpublished, the Eighth Circuit
was free to reconsider its position, but the court disagreed. Id. at 899, 905. On the
taxpayer's petition for rehearing, after learning that the IRS had capitulated to the claim on
the basis of a case in another circuit, the en banc court held that the tax issue was moot,
vacating the panel decision, but further declaring that the precedential value of unreported
opinions remains an open question in the Eighth Circuit. Anastasoff v. U.S., 235 F.3d 1054,
1056 (8th Cir. 2000). Judge Arnold's reasoning is bound to be incorporated in later briefs
and judicial opinions addressing this issue, and so is still worthy of scholarly analysis.
2. Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 899.
3. Id. at 900.
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Blackstone's Commentaries and The Federalist Papers,4 and
capped his argument with a long quotation from Justice Story.5
Judge Arnold's reasoning that Article III of the United
States Constitution prohibits judges from designating certain
opinions as unpublished, and thus not precedential, relies on two
main arguments. The first argument is that the doctrine of
precedent limits judges, so that they cannot avoid precedent in
order to "make" law, but instead must "find" law.6 The
implication of this argument is that statutes and precedents are
the only available sources of law. The second argument is that
limiting the judiciary's power to select which precedent to
follow is an essential bulwark of the doctrine of separation of
powers. Since precedent binds judges, judges are differentiated
from the legislature by their inability to choose which law to
follow. Judges must obey prior law while legislatures can reject
prior law by statute.7
Judge Arnold's argument fails to take into account the
historical complexity of establishing the role of state and federal
judges in a democratic republic. A crucial factor that Judge
Arnold's analysis fails to address is the role of the common law
in colonial America and during the years of the early Republic.
4. Id. at 901-02.
5. Id. at 903-04:
The case is not alone considered as decided and settled; but the principles
of the decision are held, as precedents and authority, to bind future cases of the
same nature. This is the constant practice under our whole system of
jurisprudence. Our ancestors brought it with them, when they first emigrated to
this country; and it is, and always has been considered, as the great security of
our rights, our liberties, and our property. It is on this account, that our law is
justly deemed certain, and founded in permanent principles, and not dependent
upon the caprice or will of judges. A more alarming doctrine could not be
promulgated by any American court, than that it was at liberty to disregard all
former rules and decisions, and to decide for itself, without reference to the
settled course of antecedent principles.
This known course of proceeding, this settled habit of thinking, this
conclusive effect of judicial adjudications, was in the full view of the framers of
the constitution. It was required, and enforced in every state in the Union; and a
departure from it would have been justly deemed an approach to tyranny and
arbitrary power, to the exercise of mere discretion, and to the abandonment of all
the just checks upon judicial authority.
Id. (quoting Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States
§§ 377-78 (1833)).
6. Id. at 901.
7. Id. at 901-02.
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While Blackstone may have claimed that judicial review was an
established tradition of the common law, Blackstone himself
was of the opinion that the common law did not apply to the
American colonies.8 Addressing the issue of when the English
common law was the law of an English colony, Blackstone said
that there were two types of colonies. In the first type, English
subjects discovered and populated an otherwise uninhabited
country. In such colonies, English colonists brought with them
all the English laws, which were immediately in force. But even
in those colonies, the laws were only in force to the extent that
they were applicable as the situation and condition of the infant
colony dictated. Many of the details of the English common law
were not in force because they were "neither necessary nor
convenient for them." 9
The second type of colony existed where the English
conquered an indigenous people or where the prior government
ceded the land to England by treaty. In those colonies, the laws
of the preceding government continued in effect until the king
changed them. Blackstone considered the American colonies as
principally of this latter sort, since they were obtained either by
treaty from other European nations (e.g., New York, which
England acquired from the Netherlands) or by conquest of the
natives. Blackstone concluded,
Our American plantations are principally of this latter sort,
being obtained in the last century either by right of
conquest and driving out the natives.., or by treaties. And
therefore the common law of England, as such, has no
allowance or authority there .... 'o
Far from providing support for Judge Arnold's claim that
the colonial judiciary was bound by common law precedent,
Blackstone's thesis was just the opposite. The course of colonial
affairs supports Blackstone's claim that the English government
8. William Blackstone, Commentaries vol. 1, * 109.
9. Id. at* *108.
10. Id. at * 109. Note that I am not arguing that Blackstone did not claim that a form of
judicial review existed. It did, and the Framers knew the basics of that philosophy.
However, the exact power of specific precedents to control American law was far from
undisputed. Since Judge Arnold based his claims about Article III power on background
assumptions of judicial review, not specific claims that the Framers made in the
Convention, this ambiguity about what precedents formed American law undermines his
claim of a unitary agreement about the nature of precedent at the time of the framing.
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did not extend common law rights to the colonies. One of the
complaints that led to the revolution was that the mother country
did not recognize the colonists' rights as English subjects to
invoke the laws' protection.'
Of course, Blackstone's opinion as to the power of the
common law in the American colonies is not determinative of
that question in the early Republic. His opinion does, however,
establish the important point that lawyers, judges, and legal
commentators contested the question of just what body of law
judges should use to decide cases in the early Republic. Some
important American commentators disagreed with Blackstone.
In his appendix to the American edition of Blackstone's
Commentaries, St. George Tucker argued that the English
colonists in America fit into the first category since they
established their colonies in areas where the natives had either
ceded the land or withdrawn from the territory. 2 Tucker then
drew the next logical step, that the English immigrants who
came out to settle in America brought with them their birthright
as English citizens, including the common law. Tucker's
conclusion was that "[t]he laws of the parent state would from
this circumstance acquire a tacit authority, and reception in all
cases to which they were applicable." ," Note that even Tucker
agreed that English precedents had to be applicable to American
conditions to be law. This brief analysis of the applicability of
the common law to the new states immediately begins to show
that Judge Arnold's claim that the Framers had a uniform and
widely accepted vision of the limits of judicial power is not
borne out by the complexity of the legal history of the early
Republic.
Whether Blackstone was correct or Tucker was correct,
both legal scholars recognized that the conditions in the New
World modified the extent to which English precedents bound
I1. The literature on the complaints of the colonists that their rights as English citizens
were being violated is truly voluminous. The starting point for the modem version of this
story is Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution (Belknap
Press, Harvard U. Press 1967). See also Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American
Republic 1776-1787 (U.N.C. Press 1969) (commenting on the implication for the
revolutionary ideology for the state-building that occurred after the Revolution).
12. St. George Tucker, Appendix, in William Blackstone, Commentaries vol. I, 382
(St. George Tucker ed., Augustus M. Kelley Publishers 1969) (originally published 1803).
13. Id. at 384.
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American judges. The decision as to what aspects of the
common law were received into the laws of the new states was
neither uniquely legislative nor uniquely judicial. Many of the
reception statutes (statutes passed by state legislatures adopting
the common law as the law of the new states) specifically left
open for judicial interpretation the question of which common
law precedents and statutes modifying this law were applicable
to the conditions of the new states.' 4 The story of the reception
of the common law into the states contradicts mightily Judge
Arnold's vision of a unitary meaning of judicial review at the
time of the founding and during the days of the early Republic.
This story contradicts Judge Arnold's in three ways. First,
judges often did pick and choose which English statutes and
common law precedents were binding within their states."
Second, judges took it upon themselves to use the customs of the
common citizens of the states as an alternative source of law to
the common law.'6 Third, even those judges who looked to the
common law as the source of American law felt that the judicial
power included the right to decide whether an American statute
complied with the common law. These judges held state statutes
14. An example of a reception statute that left to the judiciary the discretion to decide
what parts of the common law to adopt can be found in 1797 Acts and Resolves of
Vermont 71, which provided that "so much of the common law of England as is applicable
to the local situation, and circumstances, and is not repugnant to the constitution." would
be the law of the Republic. The Vermont court used this license to reject a common law
rule that required animal owners to fence in their animals. See Mooney v. Maynard, I Vt.
470 (1829) (available in 1829 WL 1057). See also Elizabeth Brown, British Statutes in
American Law 1776-1836 (U. Mich. L. Sch. 1964). Brown's work attempts to determine
which English statutes were in effect in the various states. Although this information is
very interesting, Brown does not use it to make any particular argument about the reception
of the common law. The literature on reception of the common law is not comprehensive,
although some states have had their stories told. E.g. Ray F. Bowman, Student Author,
English Common Law and Indiana Jurisprudence, 30 Ind. L. Rev. 409 (1997); Ernest G.
Mayo, Rhode Island's Reception of the Common Law, 31 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 609 (1998). In
Illinois, the reception of the common law has become an issue in that state's tort reform,
spawning articles more interested in modern day issues than historical objectivity. See e.g.
Philip H. Corboy, Curt N. Rodin & Susan J. Schwartz, Illinois Courts: Vital Developers of
Tort Law as Constitutional Vanguards, Statutory Interpreters, and Common Law
Adjudicators, 30 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 183 (1999); Victor E. Schwartz, Mark A. Behrens &
Mark D. Taylor, Illinois Tort Law: A Rich History of Cooperation and Respect between the
Courts and the Legislature, 28 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 745 (1997).
15. See infra Section I.
16. See infra Section II.
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void if they, in the judges' opinion, violated the common law.' 7
Thus, the highly contested nature of the power of the judiciary to
find the law from a variety of sources contradicts Judge
Arnold's claim that a clear vision existed of the extent of
judicial power at the time of the framing of the Constitution and
during the early days of the Republic.
This article will examine examples of the judiciary's
decisions on the reception of the common law, the use of custom
as a source of law, and the use of the common law as a means of
voiding state legislation. The article will then argue that this
complex history of the appropriate role of the judiciary
contradicts Judge Arnold's claim that the role of the judiciary
was well settled at the time of the founding. By looking at the
actions of judges during the early years of the Republic, we will
see that much disagreement existed over the role of the
judiciary.'
I. THE MULTIPLICITY OF SOURCES OF LAW
The uncertainty of what law should control in the new
states of the United States led judges to examine a wide variety
of possible sources of law. In this process, the judges had to pick
and choose from various sources of law and decide which
sources were superior.'9 This process involved extensive judicial
17. See infra Section III.
18. My argument does not address some of the other possible weaknesses in Judge
Arnold's analysis, such as his claim that American judges find law instead of make law or
even that the original intent of the Framers imbues Article Ill with specific meanings or is
even discernible. See Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 901, 903. Both of these assumptions may be
challenged, but I will leave them for others to address.
19. See e.g. Flint River Steamboat Co. v. Foster, 5 Ga. 194, 204-05 (1848) (available in
1848 WL 1547). There, the court stated:
The laws of Georgia may be thus graduated, with reference to their obligation or
authority. I st, The Constitution of the United States. 2d, Treaties entered into by
the Federal Government before, or since, the adoption of the Constitution. 3d,
Laws of the United States, made in pursuance of the Constitution. 4th, The
Constitution of the State. 5th, The Statutes of the State. 6th, Provincial Acts that
were in force, and binding on the 14th day of May, 1776, so far as they are not
contrary to the Constitution, laws and form of government of the State. 7th, The
Common Law of England, and such of the Statute Laws as were usually in force
before the revolution, with the foregoing limitation. It is the peculiar province of
the Courts to ascertain and declare when any two of these several species of law
conflict with each other; and then it follows, as a matter of course, that the less
must yield to the greater.
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discretion, contradicting Judge Arnold's characterization of
judicial review as a fairly transparent process of merely
following precedents. Several early cases exemplify the choices
that judges faced in deciding what law controlled and who could
make that decision; they also show how little precedent actually
controlled judicial decisionmaking.
A. Connecticut
In 1805 the Connecticut Supreme Court had to decide
whether a married woman, a "feme covert" as it were, had the
power to devise real estate.2° In order to decide this question, the
court worked its way through all the various sources of law that
might allow a married woman to claim such a right. First, the
court stated that the common law had no force in the Republic
except as it had been made the law of the Republic by "practical
adoption." 2' Still, the first place the court looked for a married
woman's power to devise real estate was the common law. The
court examined whether the common law gave her that power
and whether Connecticut had adopted that portion of the
common law. The court easily concluded that the common law
of feme covert forbade married women from devising property.
In searching the common law, the court looked at unspecified
"elementary writers" and "other authorities" 
-not specific
precedents.22
Since the married woman could not derive any solace from
the common law, the court next looked to see if any English
statute altered the common law on this issue. The only
applicable English statute specifically exempted married women
from its terms.2' The Connecticut court next turned to state
statutes to see if they had conferred to married women the power
to devise real estate. The pertinent statute stated:
[A]ll persons of the age of twenty-one years, of right
understanding and memory, whether excommunicated or
other, shall have full power, authority and liberty to make
20. Fitch v. Brainerd, 2 Day 163 (Conn. 1805) (available in 1805 WL 203).
21. Id., 1805 WL at *15.
22. Id.
23. Id. (citing 32 & 34 Hen. VIII).
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wills and testaments, and all other lawful alienations of
24their land and other estates.
The court reasoned that this statute did not give all persons over
twenty-one such power, but only those over twenty-one who
otherwise could convey their land; the statute merely set the age
of competency.25
However, even the search for a state statute did not exhaust
the possible sources of law that would empower a married
woman to devise her property. The court next examined whether
a Connecticut practice or custom allowed such acts. The court
could find neither "memorials" nor "traditions" of such a
custom. 26 Furthermore, the court noted that Connecticut law was
founded on the word of God and any custom that so trespassed
on the unity of the married couple would be unlikely to emerge
in a Christian state2 7
Notice that in this rundown of possible sources of the
power of a married woman to devise real property, the court
failed to look to precedents. England had, in a case decided by
no less a legal light then Lord Mansfield, changed its
matrimonial law and given to wives the power to devise their
property.2' Furthermore, a 1788 Connecticut case had adopted
Lord Mansfield's position.2 9 In the brief opposing the wife's
position, counsel had admitted these precedents' existence, but
argued that they were not correct, adding: "Nothing is more
common in England, than for judges to declare, that former
precedents are not law." 30 The Connecticut Supreme Court of
Errors agreed and ratified the attorney's argument by holding
that the opinion of the divided court in 1788 "was not law." 3
Interestingly, the court did not recognize its refusal to
follow precedent as a breach of the separation of powers. Rather,
it viewed the question whether the benefit of giving married
24. id. (citing Conn. Stat. 265).
25. Id.
26. Id. at *18.
27. Id.
28. Corbett v. Poelnitz, I Term Rep. 8, cited in Fitch, 1805 WL 203, at *5 (argument of
"plaintiff in error").
29. Kellogg v. Adams (Conn. 1788), cited in Fitch, 1805 WL 203, at *8 (argument of
plaintiff in error).
30. Fitch, 1805 WL 203, at *8 (argument of plaintiff in error).
31. Id. at *18.
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women the power to devise real estate outweighed "its obvious
mischiefs" as a legislative and not a judicial question. 2 Thus,
this court saw nothing unjudicial in declaring counsel's cited
precedents as "not law." 33
This case well exemplifies the problem with Judge
Arnold's analysis of the state of judicial review in the late
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Anti-British sentiment
warred with practical necessity when courts were forced to look
to the common law. Moreover, the content of the common law,
for American judges, was often not seen as specific precedents,
but rather the law as practiced in the specific colony. Thus
specific English precedents were not binding.34 Further, the
doctrine of precedent was so weak that this court had no
problem declaring an earlier decision as "not law" without
explanation.
B. New York
Similarly, the complex problem of deciding what body of
law should control in the new republican states led other state
judiciaries to set themselves up as the ultimate arbiters of the
question. In New York, a court refused to abide by the edict of
the state constitution or the state statutes and retained for itself
the power to determine which law should control.35 The New
York Constitution of 1821 provided that the common law and
statutes of the colony of New York as of April 19, 1775, would
be the law of the Republic.36 However, parts of the common law
and other acts that were "repugnant to this Constitution" were
abrogated.37 The Constitution of 1821 referred to an earlier
legislative session in which the legislature rephrased and
adopted as New York statutes a number of British statutes.38 The
legislation then provided that after May 1, 1788, none of the
32. Id.
33. id.
34. See infra Part I.B (discussing New York jurisprudence).
35. Bogardus v. Trinity Church, 4 Paige Ch. 178 (N.Y. Ch. 1833) (available in 1833
WL 2989)
36. N.Y. Const. of 1821, art. VII, § 13.
37. Id.
38. 1788 N.Y. Laws 88 (2 Jones and Varrick).
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statutes of England would be laws in New York.39 So by the time
of the later constitution, no English or colonial statutes had been
the formal law of the Republic for twenty-three years. In order
to make this point extremely clear, in 1828 the legislature passed
a statute reiterating that no statutes of England would be law or
have effect after May 1, 1788, and, further, that none of the
colonial statutes of New York were law after that date.40 Despite
a clear constitutional and legislative intent that English statutes
and colonial statutes have no power within the Republic, the
New York judiciary circumvented this mandate.
In 1833, a chancellor was deciding an adverse possession
case that raised the issue whether certain English statutes setting
the time for barring actions to recover real property were the law
in New York.41 In deciding whether New York courts of equity
would enforce these statutes, the chancellor held that despite the
"technical difficulty" that the state constitution and statutes
declared them not to be, the common law of England as
modified by the statutes of England had become the common
law of New York. While admitting that these English statutes,
as statutes, could not be a part of the law of New York because
of the New York statutory and constitutional provisions, the
chancellor nonetheless proclaimed the statutes could still be part
of the state common law, reasoning that judges controlled the
content of the state common law, thus not subjecting state
common law to the limitation that the legislature and the
constitution had attempted to put on these statutes.43
While the difference between enforcing a statute as positive
law and enforcing it as a statement of common law rights might
seem a fine distinction, this distinction gave the judiciary the
power to decide which English statutes and colonial New York
acts the courts would enforce. Thus, despite the constitutional
drafters' and the legislators' clear intent, this ruling allowed
judges to control the substance of New York law. Thus
Bogardus and the later New York decisions that followed its
39. Id.
40. 1828 N.Y. Laws 66.
41. Bogardus, 1833 WL 2989, at *5.
42. Id.
43. Id.
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reasoning" enabled the judiciary to avoid legislative and
constitutional attempts to limit the law that the judges could
consider. However, the judges saw themselves as free to pick
and choose from among English and colonial statutes and decide
which had been incorporated into the New York common law.
This audacious belief violates our current understanding of
separation of powers. But, contrary to Judge Arnold's analysis,
such trampling on the boundary between legislative and judicial
powers was commonplace as the outlines of our governmental
system were emerging during the early Republic.
c. Pennsylvania
Courts were not alone in their belief that judges and not
legislatures should decide what law prevailed in a state.
Pennsylvania provides an excellent example of the relationship
between the legislature and the courts in deciding what law
would form the controlling law of a state. In Pennsylvania, the
legislature turned over to the judiciary the task of identifying
which English statutes had become part of the Pennsylvania
common law.45
In an act passed in 1777,46 the Pennsylvania legislature
stated that the common law and the statutes of England that had
been in force in the colony before independence would be in
force in the new Commonwealth.47 In 1782, the Chief Justice of
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court took it upon himself to clarify
that statute. In a charge to a jury, Chief Justice McKean stated
that the common law of England had always been in force in
Pennsylvania. However, the statutes of Great Britain enacted
before the settlement of Pennsylvania had no effect within the
Republic unless they were "convenient and adapted to the
circumstances of the country. 48 Statutes passed after the
44. See Miller v. Miller, 18 Hun. 507 (1879); Lansing v. Stone, 37 Barb. 15 (N.Y. Gen.
Term 1862) (available in 1862 WL 4474); DeRuyter v. Trustees of St. Peter's Church, 3
Barb. Ch. 119 (N.Y. Ch. 1848) (available in 1848 WL 4429), affd, 3 N.Y. 238 (1850).
45. See Report of Judges, 3 Binn. app., at 533-36 (Penn. 1808) (1807 statute reported at
3 Binn. 532).
46. Act of Jan. 28, 1777, 46 Pa. Stat. § 152. This statute is discussed in Commonwealth
v. O'Brien, 124 A.2d 666, 671 (Pa. Super. 1956).
47. Id.
48. Morris's Lessee v. Vanderen, I DalI. 64, 67 (Pa. 1782).
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settlement of Pennsylvania had no effect within the Republic
unless the colonies were specifically mentioned.49
The legislature was uncomfortable with this state of affairs
and on April 7, 1807, passed an act requiring the judges of the
state supreme court to report to the next legislature those English
statutes that were in force in the Commonwealth. Thus, the
legislature certified the power of the judiciary to make specific
decisions regarding which statutes were in force within the
Republic of Pennsylvania. The supreme court judges also had no
doubt they were empowered as judges to examine the history of
the settlement of Pennsylvania and decide which statutes the
colonial courts had used. The judges not only examined the
history of Pennsylvania usage, but also ruled on the usefulness
of English statutes since only those statutes "as are useful in
their new situation, and none other" were part of the
Pennsylvania common law.5 ° Thus, the judges culled the English
statutes that did not meet the conditions of the New World or the
sensibilities of a republican government.
The actions of the legislature and the judiciary strongly
indicate that neither branch viewed choosing among English
statutes to be outside the bounds of the judicial power. However,
in 1833, a federal district court judge sitting in Pennsylvania was
called upon to decide the validity of a devise to a group of
Quakers who refused to incorporate themselves under state
law.' The common law did not allow such a devise, and the
Judges' Report of 1808 had specifically rejected incorporating
certain English statutes that amended the common law to allow
such devises. A series of precedents had ratified the Judges'
Report and held that unincorporated religious bodies could not
be the beneficiaries of a devise 2
The federal judge acknowledged that he had to follow
Pennsylvania law,53 but he took it upon himself to review the
history of the English legislation, English common law,
49. Id.
50. Report of Judges, 3 Binn. at 534.
51. Magill v. Brown, 16 F. Cas. 408 (E.D. Pa. 1833).
52. Id. at 412 (citing Methodist Church v. Remington, I Watts 218 (Pa. 1832); M'Girr
v. Aaron, I Pen. & W. 51 (Pa. 1829); Leazure v. Hillegas, 7 Serg. & Rawle 319 (Pa.
1821)).
53. Id. at 427.
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Pennsylvania legislation, and Pennsylvania custom to discover
the true state of law in Pennsylvania. After this examination, the
federal judge claimed that he had the power to determine the law
of Pennsylvania and was not bound by the state supreme court
precedents: He analyzed the various sources of Pennsylvania
law and concluded that the Quakers could receive the devise, but
his opinion then continued, "We should have rested satisfied
with results so satisfactory to our minds as these if they had not
been in some respects at variance with the understanding of the
supreme court of the state."55 He then proceeded to ignore the
cited precedents. This judge fully thought it within his Article III
powers to examine Pennsylvania legal history and ascertain
Pennsylvania common law, even in contradiction of the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
In Pennsylvania, we see once again that the doctrines of
precedent and separation of powers did not spring fully formed
into existence after 1789. The Pennsylvania legislature
acknowledged the judiciary's power to decide which statutes
were part of the law of Pennsylvania and which statutes should
have no force. Moreover, the federal judge did not feel that he
was violating his Article III powers when he ignored
Pennsylvania precedents and instead chose to reconstruct
Pennsylvania law. He showed, to his own satisfaction, that the
usage and custom of Pennsylvania had incorporated the
principles of certain English statutes into Pennsylvania law even
though the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had explicitly excluded
them. Thus, the course of reception of the common law in
Pennsylvania refutes Judge Arnold's narrow vision of American
judges willingly following prior precedents. Instead, the story is
a much more textured one of the relationship between the
legislature, the state judiciary, and even the federal judiciary in
choosing which precedents should be followed and which
should be ignored. In the next section, we shall see that judges
not only were involved in deciding which parts of the common
law were binding, but also that they felt free to reject the
common law altogether.
54. Id. at 425.
55. Id. at 427.
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II. CUSTOM AS A SOURCE OF LAW
The state judiciary in the early Republic did not feel bound
to follow the common law if the common law did not fit the
conditions of the Republic. In 1825, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court faced the problem of deciding whether to continue the
punishment of the ducking stool for women found to be
"common scolds., 56 A prosecutor had two very strong
arguments for applying the punishment. First, the practice of
ducking scolds had a long history as part of the English common
law. Furthermore, ducking was the punishment for scolds at the
time of the settlement of Pennsylvania. Since the usual rule was
that the common law as it existed at the time of settlement was
the law that the colonists brought with them, the law sanctioning
the use of ducking should have been received in Pennsylvania. 7
Second, ducking had been incorporated into the common
law of Pennsylvania. As illustrated in the New York cases
discussed earlier, actual practices in the colonial courts could
became part of a state's common law, separate and apart from a
state's statutory reception of the English common law. The
prosecutor in James discovered a 1769 case in the Philadelphia
quarter sessions in which a woman was sentenced to ducking
and the sentence was carried out." In 1779, the sentence was
again adjudged and enforced. 9 In 1781, the Philadelphia court
continued a case of scolding until the woman finally agreed to
leave the jurisdiction.6° The prosecutor argued that since these
cases took place in Philadelphia, the General Assembly must
have known of them.6 Yet in revising the penal code in 1790,
the Assembly had not abolished this punishment when it
abolished other common law punishments. The general savings
clause of the penal statute thus protected ducking when it stated,
"[E]very other felony or misdemeanor whatsoever, not
specifically provided for by that act, may and shall be punished
56. James v. Commonwealth, 12 Serg. & Rawle 220, (Pa. 1825) (available in 1825 WL
1899).
57. Id., 1825 WL 1899, at *3-5.
58. Id. at *12 (citing The King v. Mary Conway (no additional citation information
furnished in the opinion)).
59. Id. (citing State v. Ann Maize).
60. Id. (discussing, but not citing, the case of Mary Swann).
61. Id. at *4.
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as heretofore." 62 Thus, from the prosecutor's point of view, the
penal clause had incorporated ducking into the law of
Pennsylvania.
The Pennsylvania judiciary was faced with a punishment
well established in English common law and with verified
colonial and state usage. Furthermore, the legislature, at least by
implication, had ratified this punishment. Judge Duncan, writing
for the court, acknowledged that ducking, although a "cruel,
unusual, unnatural and ludicrous judgment," 63 must be enforced
if it was the law of the land. The court's job was to determine,
then, what the law was. Judge Duncan reasoned that ducking
had been repealed by "a kind of silent legislation." 64 He
explained that a custom of long non-use could amend the
common law. Despite the unquestionable existence of ducking
in the common law, the court had the power to determine
whether the common law fit the time and circumstances of the
people. As time and circumstances change, the courts can
recognize this change by ignoring old precedents.
However, this analysis still left unresolved the problem that
ducking had been practiced in Pennsylvania less than fifty years
previously. The quarter session judges had been following what
they thought was the law of the land. Judge Duncan was sure,
however, that the panel that continued the woman's case until
she left town was trying to avoid inflicting the punishment. He
noted that "this highly respectable court whose decision we are
now revising, were probably governed by these precedents,
considering them conclusive evidence of the adoption of this
punishment, and making it the law of the land." 65 Judge Duncan
concluded that ducking had never been part of the common law
of Pennsylvania and that the quarter sessions' judgments were
not evidence that it had been received. "I cannot give to the two
62. Id.
63. Id. at *5.
64. Id. at *8.
65. Id. at * 12. Of course, no one argued that the court was bound by the decisions of
the quarter session judges. The issue was whether the use of ducking by these judges had
incorporated ducking into Pennsylvania's common law. The doctrine seemed to be that
such a usage would make the punishment part of the State's common law. The court,
however, refused to give the older judgments such weight.
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precedents from the quarter sessions of Philadelphia, the weight
of decisions."66
Interestingly, Judge Duncan never reached the questions
whether this punishment was part of the statutory law or whether
the constitutions of the United States or the State forbade it. The
prosecutor had argued that Pennsylvania penal law had
incorporated the statute. The defense had argued that the
punishment violated constitutional guarantees. The court did not
need to address any of these issues.67 Because this punishment
was not part of Pennsylvania law, ducking could not be revived
by the legislature nor did it need to be weighed against
constitutional protections.
This case further exemplifies the subtlety of judicial review
and of judicial power in the early Republic. Contrary to Judge
Arnold's claims that precedent bound judges, judges in the early
Republic saw their job as including the power to decide-from a
wide variety of sources-what the law was. Judges had the
power to pick and choose between sources of law in fulfilling
that duty.6
Courts did not just use their power to establish the law to
rid the American law of arcane punishments. American courts
also used their power to choose between sources of law in order
to reject vital, living common law concepts. In Seely v. Peters ,
the Illinois Supreme Court rejected a well-established line of
English and American precedents on the ground that these
precedents contradicted the customs of Illinois agriculturists.
The issue in Seely was who had the duty to fence land-
cultivators who grew crops or stockowners who ran their
animals on the extensive unfenced range of this frontier state?
This issue was important to the agricultural community, and
therefore the attorneys argued all the possible sources of law to
the Illinois Supreme Court: English precedents, American
precedents, legislative acts, and customary practices. This wide-
ranging argument was necessary because judges, as seen earlier,
were used to searching for law in a wide variety of sources.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. See Tucker v. Adams, 14 Ga. 548 (1854) (concluding that Georgia had never
adopted the Rule in Shelley's Case into its law).
69. 10 Ill. 130 (1848) (available in 1848 WL 4133).
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Contrary to Judge Arnold's claims, judicial power extended well
beyond merely applying precedents. The judges in Seely
considered all the possible arguments that could be derived from
a variety of sources of law, an inquiry that went to decide a case
in which the damages were four dollars and ten cents.
In this case, Samuel Seely's hogs broke through William
Peters's fence and damaged his crops. Seely argued that because
Peters's fence did not conform to statutory requirements, Seely
was not responsible for the damage the animals inflicted. The
trial court instructed the jury that the common law required
animal owners to fence in their animals. The hog owner
appealed the resulting verdict against him, arguing that the
common law rule did not apply in Illinois. William Herndon,
Abraham Lincoln's law partner, argued for the landowner, citing
a string of twelve American cases that had used the common law
to invalidate statutes requiring farmers to fence. ° He cited cases
from Massachusetts and New York, as well as a Maine case,
Little v. Lathrop, but failed to mention that a later Maine case,
Gooch v. Stephenson, had overruled the holding that the
common law was superior to Maine's statutes on this issue."
Herndon argued that the existence of Illinois's reception statute
proved that the legislature had adopted the common law 2
Peters argued that the common law remained in effect
unless explicitly overturned by statute and that the Illinois
statute describing legal fences merely provided cumulative relief
alongside the common law relief.7' His counsel offered an
intensive statutory analysis, as well as arguing that English and
American precedents required animal owners to fence in their
stock. They conducted a section-by-section search of the fencing
statute, attempting to prove that the extensive legislative
regulation of this issue had not preempted the common law,
concluding that the statute was only meant to apply to partition
fences, that is, fences dividing one person's land from another
person's land.74 From this conclusion, Peters claimed that the
statute could not apply to fences bounding the range or the
70. Id., 1848 WL 4133, at*1.
71. Id. at *1, 12.
72. Id. at *1-2.
73. Id. at *2 (citing an unnamed Illinois statute enacted Feb. 4, 1819).
74. Seely, 1848 WL 4133, at *3 (discussing Ill. Rev. Stat. 51).
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roadways, and therefore the statute could not give animal
owners the right to run their animals on the range. He concluded
that the statute, instead of voiding the common law, provided an
additional remedy in certain situations. Under that theory, the
common law existed as a completely separate remedy for
landowners ."
The court decided in favor of the stock owner. The majority
opinion engaged in an extensive analysis of the legislative
history and the contemporary legislation. Judge Lyman
Trumbull rejected Herndon's argument that the court must
strictly construe the statute so as to avoid a conflict with the
common law. Instead he stated that the common law, and all the
English and American precedents interpreting it, did not apply in
Illinois since the reception statute only adopted the common law
"so far as the same is applicable."76 Illinois courts had
interpreted this provision to allow them to choose which parts of
the common law acted as law within the Republic. Courts were
only bound to follow the common law to the extent that the
common law met the needs of the Republic. Judge Trumbull
examined the customary agricultural practices of Illinois and
asserted that "[i]t has been the custom in Illinois so long, that
the memory of man runneth not to the contrary, for the owners
of stock to suffer them to run at large."77 The judge not only
denied the requirement to follow the common law, but he also
pointed out that Illinois statutes differed from the statutes in
northeastern states, a difference which further allowed Illinois's
courts to ignore such precedents.78
Moreover, custom could serve as an independent limit on
using the common law and common law precedents as a source
of law. Judge Trumbull noted the custom in Illinois of allowing
stock to run at large. "Settlers have located themselves
contiguous to prairies for the very purpose of getting the benefit
of the range. The right of all to pasture their cattle upon the
75. Id. at*1.
76. Id. at *7.
77. Id. at *9. Although the court used the age-old common law formula for
prescription, it could not have meant to rely on that doctrine. European settlement in
Illinois was not old enough to meet the common law requirements for prescription. This
statement must have been just a rhetorical flourish.
78. Seely, 1848 WL 4133, at *10-11 (citing, among others, Studwell v. Ritch, 14 Conn.
292 (1841)).
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uninclosed ground is universally conceded."7 9 He further noted
that this custom was, itself, an independent source of law. This
"universal understanding.., is entitled to no little consideration
in determining what the law is, and we should feel inclined to
hold, independent of any statutes upon the subject," that the
common law does not apply.8° The custom of the land was a
powerful enough source of law that, even without statutory
reinforcement, it could overcome the common law rule.
The majority well knew that its use of custom and the
reception statute to ignore English and American precedent
violated the common law theory of judicial powers. The
dissenter, Judge John Caton, scolded the majority for taking
upon itself the power to decide which part of the common law
was applicable under the reception statute. Judge Caton argued
that such judicial infringement on legislative power was "too
dangerous to admit of defense." 8 Judge Caton then attempted to
protect the common law as the sole source of law, but even he
could not limit himself to only looking to precedent for the
source of law. He argued on the one hand that "the common law
is most unquestionably the law of natural justice." 82 On the other
hand, intermixed with such assertions about the origin of law, he
made instrumentalist claims: "One acre in tillage is of more
value than many acres of wild grass. . 83
Judge Caton even made arguments based on custom. His
dissenting opinion disagreed with the majority both as to what
Illinois custom was and as to custom's role as a source of law.
He argued, "It is within my personal knowledge, that in many
portions of the State ... it has never been the custom to allow
swine and sheep to go at large." 4 Judge Caton relied on his own
trial court experience as a source of custom: "I have been for
about sixteen years constantly engaged in the courts of this
State, and this is the first decision.., where the common law
has not been held to apply." 85 But even more important, custom
79. Id. at *9.
80. Id.
81. Id. at *12 (Caton, J., dissenting).
82. Id. at *13.
83. Id.
84. Seely, 1848 WL 4133, at *14 (Caton, J., dissenting).
85. Id.
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should not be a source of law; because it leads to anarchy and
chaos:
When the principle becomes established that the courts
shall construe the law as the people understand it, then will
a Cleon be justified in taking an appeal from the decision of
the judge upon the bench, to the multitude in the court
house yard.
No common lawyer better expressed the slippery slope that
allowing custom to overcome the common law could lead to, or
the implicit fear of too much democracy. His very vehemence,
however, suggests that use of custom as a source of law was
common practice.
In the same paragraph in which he cited his knowledge of
agricultural practices, Judge Caton attacked the majority's
notions of agricultural practice in deciding what the law should
be, apparently oblivious to the contradiction. The explanation
for this blindness is that Judge Caton used a common law
analysis, and within this vision, the common law was not the
willed intent of the judiciary, but was a set of "well settled
rules." 87 Popular will and long-lived customs, far from being the
basis of law, were its greatest enemies.
Who does not see, if we start out with the principle of
making our decisions conform to public opinion, and for a
justification, say that the genius of our people, and their
customs and habits demand it, we shall soon end in making
our notions of their wants and interests, rather than the
common law or the express statute, the rule of
determination.., we shall be left to our own arbitrary
notions of what is best adapted to the public good.88
Long before the legal realists or the critical legal studies
movement, Judge Caton looked the indeterminacy of judicial
decisionmaking in the face and recoiled from what he saw.
The Seely opinion once again shows that Judge Arnold's
version of the role of judicial review in limiting judicial powers
during the early Republic was based on an overly-simplified
86. Id. Cleon was an Athenian general who came to power through popular acclaim
after winning a battle against the Spartans. His corruption was ridiculed in two plays by
Aristophanes.
87. Id.
88. Seely, 1848 WL4133, at *14.
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view of American legal history. Judges looked to a wide variety
of sources, not merely to judicial precedents, in deciding what
the law should be. As our legal system matured, as more
American precedents were available in published reports, and as
legislatures addressed more specific problems with statutory
solutions, the idea that courts should limit their inquiries to cases
and statutes became heard more often. Judges like Caton in
Seely and Story in his Commentaries on the Constitution of the
United States,89 argued that judges should limit themselves in
their search for sources of law. However, we must remember
that these judges were engaged in an active debate with judges
of different sensibilities. They were not stating the consensus
about judicial power, but were engaged in an ongoing debate.
Within this debate, Caton and Story were the ones trying to
transform the judiciaries' view of the appropriate role of judges
in the Republic. Far from reflecting the Framers' view of
judicial power, they reflected the next wave of formalistic,
scientific jurisprudence that saw its high-water mark in
Christopher Columbus Langdell's scholarship and pedagogy. 90
III. COMMON LAW AS FUNDAMENTAL AND SUPERIOR
TO STATE STATUTES
As we have seen in the first two sections, the parameters of
judicial power were highly contested in the late colonial and
early Republic periods. One group of judges did tend to look to
the common law as the sole source of judicial authority,
seemingly in line with Judge Arnold's claims about the power of
the judiciary under Article III. However, even those judges who
saw precedents as binding had a much different view of judicial
power than Judge Arnold insists. For these judges, the common
law was not just the source of all judicial power, but was the
source of all law. The common law was fundamental to the law
89. Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States (Hilliard,
Gray & Co. 1833); see also supra n. 5 (Justice Story was quoted by Judge Arnold in
Anastasoff 223 F.3d at 903-04).
90. See Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law, 1780-1860 (Harv. U.
Press 1977) (arguing that formalism triumphed in American courts after the 1840s).
Horwitz's visions of courts' partiality toward economic interest has been challenged. Peter
Karsten, Heart Versus Head: Judge-Made law in Nineteenth-Century America (U.N.C.
Press 1997).
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of the Republic and preceded the founding documents of the
Republic. The most controversial claim of judges who took this
view of the power of precedent was that legislatures did not
have the power to alter this fundamental law. Judges who took
this view exercised the power to void legislation, not because a
statute violated the state constitution, but because it violated the
judicial vision of what the law "was." These judges exercised
the power to declare legislative acts void because they violated
the "fundamental law."
A good example of this claim for judicial power arose in
the case of Stackpole v. Healy,9' where the court ruled that if a
Massachusetts statute allowed animal owners to turn animals out
to graze, then it was void as violating the fundamental law.92 A
herder had turned his cattle out to graze along the highway.
While grazing, the animals broke into the plaintiff's land
through a fence that failed to meet statutorily prescribed
standards. When the landowner brought a trespass claim against
the herder, the herder responded that under the Massachusetts
fence statute, his cattle had a right to be on the highways. The
herder further argued that since a Massachusetts statute required
landowners to build fences sufficient to turn cattle, the failure of
the landowner to have such a fence was a defense against the
claimed trespass.
The court rejected the herder's argument. Justice Samuel
Putnam cited the common law and Massachusetts statutes for
the proposition that the owner of property maintains all rights in
a highway. The landowner's grant of land to the Republic for the
road merely granted to the public a right of passage. The court
then ruled that statutes that claimed to allow animals to run at
large could not change the common law rule that animal owners
had a duty to fence in their animals. 93 Therefore the statute,
despite its plain terms, did not give animals the right to graze on
the road. Since the cattle were on the highway grazing, they
were violating their license and thus were trespassing. Applying
an earlier precedent, Rust v. Low, 94 which held that a landowner
had no duty to fence against these animals if they were
91. 16 Mass. 33 (1819) (available in 1819 WL 1457).
92. Id., 1819 WL 1457, at *3-4.
93. Stackpole, 1819 WL 1457, at *4.
94. 6 Mass. 90 (1809) (available in 1809 WL 1119).
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wrongfully on the adjacent land, this court ruled for the
landowner.9
The reasoning in Stackpole reflects the assumption of the
judges who were wedded to the power of the common law that
the common law preceded the founding of the Republic. The
herder's interpretation of the relevant Massachusetts statute was
reasonable and could have led to a decision favoring the animal
owner. The true importance of the earlier Rust case, relied upon
in Stackpole, was not its narrow holding about fencing animals.
The true importance was that Rust adopted the common law
protection of property. Stackpole elevated Rust's protection of
real property to the status of fundamental law, which the
legislature could not modify.
The dicta in Stackpole made the common law judge's
position perfectly clear. After Justice Putnam informed the
plaintiff that his interpretation of the Massachusetts statute on
allowing animals to run at large was incorrect, he examined the
hypothetical result of the plaintiff's position. If the legislature
intended to allow animals to run at large on the highway, then
the legislation would be void as violating the fundamental rights
of property owners. Land ownership included the absolute right
to all usage of the land. The legislature could not divest the
property owner of any aspect of ownership. The common law
protected the property owner's rights to all parts of the land,
including the herbage on the side of the road. For the legislature
to allow animals to graze this herbage would violate the
fundamental law.96 Thus the court declared a practice that had
been commonplace for two centuries to violate the basic rules of
civilization and to be beyond the power of a democratically
elected legislature to decree. Justice Putnam never referred to
the state constitution to support this ruling. Instead the court
found the limitations on legislative power in the fundamental
law.
This vision of the power of judges to use common law to
limit legislative power fails to confirm Judge Arnold's analysis
of the meaning of judicial review in the early national period.
Instead of raising a bulwark between judicial and legislative
95. Stackpole, 1819 WL 1457, at *2.
96. Id. at *3.
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power, this view of the precedential analysis tramples on that
distinction. These judges found that their power to "find" law
gave them a complementary power to protect that law from
legislative encroachment, without any reference to constitutional
limitations.
New York judges also adopted the view that fundamental
law limited the powers of the state legislature without a need to
refer to the state constitution. In New York a case involving a
cow with a fatal sweet tooth set the stage for the conversion of
Rust and Stackpole into black letter law.97 A man named Bush
owned an unfenced maple forest that he tapped, at the
appropriate time of year, to make maple syrup. During the syrup
season Bush left buckets of syrup in an open shed on his
property. Brainard's cow found its way to the shed and
proceeded to drink the syrup. Acting in a manner more swinish
than bovine, the cow drank to such an excess that it died.
Brainard sued for the value of the animal. Bush interposed the
defense that the cow was wrongfully on his property so he owed
it no duty. The court, in a very brief opinion, analogized this
case to an English case where a horse fell in a pit and destroyed
itself. In that case the horse's owner did not recover since the
horse should not have been on the land containing the pit.9"
Since common law prevailed in New York, animals could not
run at large unless a town regulation so allowed, and neither
party had introduced evidence of a town regulation. Chief
Justice John Savage thus deduced that, although Bush had been
grossly negligent in leaving the syrup where the cow might have
access to it, the cow owner could not recover because he had
illegally let his cow run at large. 9
The opinion itself filled just two pages of the New York
reports, but reporter Esek Cowen's footnote proving that the
common law prevailed in the Republic and that the cow was
illegally at large flowed on for thirteen pages. In the footnote,
Cowen set out his version of New York fencing law. The
common law required everyone to keep his beasts on his close.
Exceptions to the common law rule existed if a statute,
prescriptive duty or contract required the landowner to fence his
97. Bush v. Brainard, I Cow. 78 (N.Y. 1823) (available in 1823 WL 1765).
98. Id., 1823 WL 1765, at *1 (citing Blyth v. Tophamn, Cro. Jac. 158, 9).
99. Id. at *2.
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land. Cowen adopted the reasoning of the Massachusetts
precedents that only animal owners whose animals are rightfully
on adjoining land can raise objections to the state of a
landowner's fences. Cowen concluded "that [a landowner] is
not bound to fence, except against such cattle only as are
lawfully in the adjoining close ..."'00
Cowen did not stop with this conclusion, however. Because
an animal owner might claim that cattle on the highway are
legally at large, Cowen closed this loophole by examining three
common law cases. He deduced that cattle can lawfully be in the
road only if they are in transit and accompanied by a herder. If
the cattle are grazing in the road, then they are not rightfully in
the highway and landowners do not have to fence against
them.'0 ' The proposition that cattle cannot run free on the
highway seemed to contradict a New York statute that gave
towns the power to allow animals to run at large.'0 2 So Cowen
took the next logical step and said that the legislature could not
"take the property of one man and give it to another," i.e., allow
grazing on the highway.' 3  To avoid this violation of
fundamental law, Cowen interpreted the statute in question as
only allowing towns to regulate animals running at large in the
100. Id. at *1. Nothing in the report indicates that Cowen, and not Justice Savage, was
the author of this footnote. None of the many cases citing this footnote acknowledged that
the footnote was merely a reporter's annotation. Later, lawyers and judges treated the
footnote as a correct and complete statement of New York law, even in New York. Not
until 1849 did a New York court specifically reject Cowen's reasoning that the legislature
could not authorize the towns to allow animals to run at large, and in that context point out
that the reporter wrote the footnote. Griffin v. Martin, 7 Barb. 297, 301 (N.Y. Sup. Gen.
Term 1849) (available in 1849 WL 5230). We also know that Esek Cowen wrote the note
because in the second edition of A Treatise on the Civil Jurisdiction of Justices of the
Peace in the State of New York, which Sidney Cowen revised after his father's death, he
quoted from a "note of the reporter" in Bush v. Brainard. See Esek Cowen, Treatise on the
Civil Jurisdiction of the Justices of the Peace in the State of New-York vol. 1, 427 (O.L.
Barbour, ed., 3d ed., Wm. & A. Gould & Co. 1844) (incorporating the additions and
corrections made in the second edition by Sidney J. Cowen). This example of the power of
the reporters to integrate their legal theories into opinions in a seamless manner warns us
against the danger of assuming that judges alone controlled the substance of the law.
101. Bush, 1823 WL 1765, at *1.
102. Note that the probable purpose of this statute had been to allow towns to close the
range in the midst of a general open range countryside. Thus the original intent, to give real
property owners more control over their property, ironically became the chink in the armor
of real property rights.
103. Bush, 1823 WL 1765, at * 1.
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common lands of the town, an interpretation that effectively
voided it.
The footnote in Bush was not unique in finding a judicial
power to void statutes that violated fundamental law. In 1829,
the New York high court used common law reasoning to nullify
a statute that allowed a landowner to give three months' notice
that he would no longer maintain a partition fence. '° After the
time ran, the landowner could throw down his fence and leave
his lands open. An animal owner followed these procedures and,
after the three-month waiting period, took down his fence. His
cattle predictably wandered into a neighbor's field. The adjacent
landowner sued in trespass, and the herder raised the statute as a
defense, saying that his neighbor had three months to take steps
to avoid the damage. The trial court rejected this defense, the
jury found for the plaintiff, and the defendant moved for a new
trial.
On appeal, Justice Savage agreed that the statute could not
give the herder the right to let his animals run at large.
According to Savage's narrow interpretation of the statute, only
if the land was next to a town commons and the town allowed
animals to run at large on that commons would the notice
provisions allow a herder to let his animals run free.'05 The
problem with this reasoning is that if the land adjoined a town
commons then there would be no need for notice, since no one
would be harmed if the landowner removed his fence and
enlarged the commons. In effect, this decision made the statute a
dead letter: a herder could throw down his fences but would still
be responsible for restraining his animals.' 6
Thus, by 1830 the New York judiciary, with a hefty assist
from reporter Cowen, seemed to have set the stage for declaring
void the New York legislation that allowed towns to regulate
animals running at large. In 1830 the New York state legislature
intervened to reassert its rights.'0 7 The legislature amended the
township fence statute to allow the town council to determine
the sufficiency of all fences, not just partition and circular
104. Holladay v. Marsh, 3 Wend. 142 (N.Y. 1829) (available in 1829 WL 2393).
105. Id., 1829 WL 2393 (no star pagination available).
106. Id.
107. See Griffin, 7 Barb. at 301 (available in 1849 WL 5230) (interpreting the relevant
statute, I N.Y. Rev. Stat. 340, 341, § 5, sub. II).
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fences. The legislature also added a phrase authorizing the towns
to regulate the times and manner of allowing animals to run "at
large on the highways."'O0 By adding the phrase "at large on the
highways," the legislature directly challenged the Bush holding
by requiring landowners to fence against animals ranging on the
roads. The courts, however, did not lightly accept this usurpation
of their prerogative. The validity of the legislative enactment
became the focal point of the next round of anti-range, anti-
legislative judicial statements.
Esek Cowen refused to accept the legislature's attempt to
limit the common law rights of property owners and he attacked
this legislation in his Treatise on the Civil Jurisdiction of
Justices of the Peace.'°9 Cowen's stature as a legal scholar could
greatly influence the often-untutored justices of the peace to
whom he directed this work. So Cowen attempted to arm the
justices of the peace with a variety of arguments for striking
down the town ordinances that attempted to use the renewed
legislative grant of power, and he successfully persuaded at least
some lower level judges. A Court of Common Pleas reversed a
jury that had found a defendant not liable for his animals'
trespass because an ordinance allowed stock at large on the
highway and the plaintiff had not fenced along the highway. The
justices of the peace ruled that the by-law was void as violating
the common law despite the explicit legislative authorization."0
These justices were not the only ones to strike down the
New York legislation as violating the common law. The issue
also arose in the context of an accident between a bull and a
train."' When a Tonawanda train came through the town of
Gates at midnight, traveling at eight or nine miles per hour, it
ran upon some oxen owned by Mr. Munger, killing them, but
also derailing the engine. The oxen were legally at large since
108. Id.
109. See Cowen, supra n. 100, vol. 2, 418-33. The second edition, edited by Sidney
Cowen, was probably the one where the attack on the 1830 statute first appeared. In
Griffin, the court noted that the legislature amended this statute to rescue it from the
construction of Esek Cowen in his Bush note and treatise. 1849 WL 5230. Therefore the
first treatise must have merely echoed Bush, and the second treatise must have launched the
attack on the amended statute.
110. See Cowen, supra n. 100, at vol. 2, 431 n. 7.
111. Tonawanda R.R. Co. v. Munger, 5 Denio 255 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1848) (available in
1848 WL 4485).
THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS
the town of Gates, by town ordinance, allowed livestock to run
at large. The ordinance specifically required all landowners to
enclose their property with legal fences." 2
The trial court judge instructed the jury that under the
regulations of the town of Gates, the oxen were not trespassers
on the railroad's right-of-way. The jury found in favor of Mr.
Munger, awarding him the value of the oxen. On appeal, Judge
Samuel Beardsley rejected the instruction that the oxen were not
trespassers. The appellate court ignored the town's power to
allow livestock to roam and held that the railroad company's
ownership of the land made any unwarrantable entry a
trespass. The court ruled that the common law controlled,
despite a New York statute that permitted towns to allow
animals to run at large.1"4 In order to avoid requiring the
railroads to fence, the Court had to take the step only hinted at in
Stackpole and Bush: it had to declare the township statute
unconstitutional. The court adopted the hypothetical reasoning
found in Stackpole and that of Cowen's note used in Bush. If
cattle could roam at large under the terms of the town regulation,
then they had the right to graze. If they had the right to graze,
the court reasoned, the government had authorized an illegal
taking of the grass and herbage from the property owner. Such a
taking legalized the transfer of property-grass-from the
landowner to the stockowner, and the legislature had no power
to authorize this transfer. The court never cited any New York
constitutional provision, but instead cited precedents, including
Stackpole, to hold this action by the state legislation void as
violating fundamental law."5
This example of the jurisprudence of the judges who
subscribed to the theory that common law precedent was the
sole source of law still does not support Judge Arnold's claim
that subservience to precedent protects the doctrine of separation
of powers. Instead, these judges interpreted the power of the
common law to allow them to sit in judgment on the legislature.
Judicial review of legislation was not just a matter of judging
whether legislators followed constitutional procedure. Instead,
112. Id., 1848 WL 4485, at *4.
113. id. at *2.
114. Id. at *3 (citing I N.Y. Rev. Stat. 341, § 5, sub. 11).
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judicial review consisted of measuring legislative enactments
against the fundamental law, a law that only judges could
ascertain. If the legislation violated this fundamental law, it was
void, even if the legislature had fully complied with the
constitution in passing it. Far from limiting the courts to their
proper sphere, this power to determine the fundamental law by
interpreting precedents gave courts the power to violate
separation-of-power doctrines and invade the legislative sphere.
Precedential analysis, according to these judges, expanded the
judiciary's power to allow them to void statutes. Thus, the
complexity of the history of judicial review in the early Republic
fails to support Judge Arnold's claims that the doctrine of
precedent, as understood in the late twentieth century, was a
background assumption for the Framers of Article III of the
Constitution.
IV. CONCLUSION
At the time of the framing of the Constitution, no one knew
the exact role that judges would have in the new experiment in
government that formed the United States. While the British
example was foremost in the minds of constitutional framers,
state and federal, many differences in material circumstances
and governmental structure would prohibit the emergence of a
judiciary that strictly adhered to that model. These examples
from the history of judging during the years of the early
Republic show that not only the relative roles of judges and the
legislature, but also the sources of law, and even the meaning of
allowing judges the power to "find" law, were all contested
issues. Judge Arnold can probably take the most solace from this
history by realizing that American judges have always been
quick to experiment with different styles of judging when faced
with changed conditions. The Internet age confronts the modern
judiciary with many changes, among them the increased access
that all attorneys have to previously unavailable opinions.
Perhaps instead of looking to the past for an answer to this
conundrum, the answer lies in the present and in the future.

